ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Th e attacks on the Twin Towers in New York took place ten years ago. Partly in due of the attacks huge numbers of regulations directed at combating terrorism on a global, European and national level were subsequently enacted across the world. Soon aft er the 11 September 2001 attacks, the European Commission took the initiative to publish a Framework Decision on combating terrorism ('the Framework Decision'). 1 Aft er some amendments, the Framework Decision was adopted as early as 13 June 2002, 2 in order to harmonise what constitutes criminal acts relating to terrorism in the national legislation of Member States.
Th e most important provision of the Framework Decision is Article 1, which describes the conditions in which criminal acts will be considered terrorist off ences. First of all, nine categories of behaviour are listed that, if committed intentionally, will be considered terrorist off ences. Next, it is stated that these nine categories of behaviour must be "defi ned as off ences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation". Finally, terrorist intent -that is, any of the varieties of intent mentioned in Article 1(1) -must be present.
Th is defi nition of terrorist off ences prompts several questions, of which I will discuss two in this contribution. I will fi rst discuss the second part of the defi nition in the Framework Decision, being the requirement that it concerns "off ences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation". To what extent was the stipulation of an independent requirement of endangerment intended? Secondly, the position of activists, demonstrators and strikers under this Framework Decision will be discussed. To what extent will criminal acts committed by such individuals fall within the defi nition of terrorist off ences? As will be shown, this question is closely connected to the meaning of 'terrorist intent', the third element of the defi nition of terrorist off ences in the Framework Decision.
2.
REQUIREMENT OF ENDANGERMENT?
DIFFERENT POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS
It is usually assumed in literature that the phrase "which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation" should be regarded as an objective requirement for qualifying punishable behaviour as a terrorist off ence. 3 It is argued that this means a requirement for the behaviour, given its nature and context, to pose a certain threat of politically or publicly motivated violence. 4 It must be established, on the basis of the specifi c behaviour and the circumstances in which it took place, whether serious damage was caused to a country or an international organisation, or whether a certain threat of such damage existed. Th is can then be regarded as a requirement of endangerment. If no damage was caused and no threat of damage existed in a specifi c case, the qualifi cation 'terrorist off ence' would not apply. Th is establishes a clear distinction between terrorist and non-terrorist varieties of the punishable behaviour referred to in Article 1(1). 5 Whether the draft ers of the Framework Decision indeed intended the second part of Article 1(1) to serve as an objective requirement is neither positively nor negatively evidenced by the history of the Framework Decision. Th ere may be some doubt as to whether the second part of Article 1(1) should in fact be interpreted as a 'hard' objective requirement.
If one concentrates, from a textual point of view, on the Dutch and German language versions, 6 the quoted phrase could be regarded as a descriptive sub-clause, and not as a separate requirement. Th e text then plainly reads that, depending on their nature or context, the nine categories of punishable behaviour listed may seriously damage a country or an international organisation. In this interpretation a sort of explanation of the nine categories of punishable behaviour is given: these off ences are in abstracto so serious that they are generally suited -or, to formulate it more cautiously, not in themselves unsuited -to seriously damaging a country or international organisation. 7 Th is does not mean that the serious damage, or the chance thereof, will manifest itself on each occasion. Th e punishable behaviour referred to in this Article certainly does not have to be specifi cally directed against a country or international organisation.
In the English and French versions, however, Article 1(1) reads somewhat diff erently from the Dutch and German versions. Th e quoted phrase in these versions appears to be connected with terrorist intent: the behaviour may, given the nature or context, cause serious damage to a country or international organisation if it is Th e fi rst part of Article 1(1) in the German language version of the Framework Decision states that "Jeder Mitgliedstaat trifft die erforderlichen Maßnahmen, um sicherzustellen, dass die unter den Buchstaben a) bis i) aufgeführten, nach den einzelstaatlichen Rechtsvorschrift en als Straft aten defi nierten vorsätzlichen Handlungen, die durch die Art ihrer Begehung oder den jeweiligen Kontext ein Land oder eine internationale Organisation ernsthaft schädigen können, als terroristische Straft aten eingestuft werden, wenn sie mit dem Ziel begangen werden, (…)". In the Dutch language version: "Iedere lidstaat neemt de maatregelen die noodzakelijk zijn om ervoor te zorgen dat de onder a) tot en met i) bedoelde opzettelijke gedragingen, die door hun aard of context een land of een internationale organisatie ernstig kunnen schaden en die overeenkomstig het nationale recht als strafb are feiten zijn gekwalifi ceerd, worden aangemerkt als terroristische misdrijven, indien de dader deze feiten pleegt met het oogmerk om (…)". committed with terrorist intent. 8 In this interpretation of Article 1(1), terrorist intent colours the nature of the off ence and the circumstances in which it is committed. Th e off ender's objective of causing serious damage to a country or international organisation is contained in the terrorist intent. 9 Th e reference to 'nature or context' could then be seen as a reference to the combination of an inherently serious criminal act and the presence of terrorist intent, with the factual consequence that the specifi c behaviour may seriously damage a country or international organisation.
It is also possible to establish a link in another way between the nature and/or context of the specifi c behaviour on the one hand and the presence of terrorist intent on the other. Not only does the existence of that intent say something about the endangerment posed by the specifi c behaviour, but something about the existence of terrorist intent can also be inferred from the nature and context of the behaviour. 10 Some acts are of such a serious and destructive nature that, even if nothing is known about the off ender's objective, this indicates the act was committed with terrorist intent. Here the emphasis is not on setting an independent requirement of endangerment resulting from the nature and/or context of the specifi c behaviour, but instead on establishing a form of evidence in which that nature and context are key.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN TERRORIST AND NON-TERRORIST OFFENCES
Th e above shows that the second part of Article 1(1) can be interpreted and applied such that it is not considered an independent and objective requirement for qualifying punishable behaviour as a terrorist off ence. In view of the diff erent approaches to the phrase "given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation", it can furthermore be concluded that there are essentially two possible ways of distinguishing the terrorist off ences listed in Article 1(1) from non-terrorist off ences.
8
Th e fi rst part of Article 1 in the English language version of the Framework Decision states that "Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts referred to below in points (a) to (i), as defi ned as off ences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of: (…) shall be deemed to be terrorist off ences (…)". In the French language version: "Chaque État membre prend les mesures nécessaires pour que soient considérés comme infractions terroristes les actes intentionnels visés aux points a) à i), tels qu'ils sont défi nis comme infractions par le droit national, qui, par leur nature ou leur contexte, peuvent porter gravement atteinte à un pays ou à une organisation internationale lorsque l'auteur les commet dans le but de: (…)".
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Here I consider seriously intimidating a population to be on a par with seriously damaging a country. 
Intersentia
Firstly, this distinction can be made primarily on the basis of the degree of endangerment in the specifi c punishable behaviour. 11 Th e second part of Article 1(1) is then regarded as a separate (objective) requirement. Th e main consequence of this view is that the existence of terrorist intent is not the decisive factor in qualifying punishable behaviour as a terrorist off ence. In other words, punishable behaviour within the meaning of Article 1(1) can be committed with terrorist intent, but will not be qualifi ed as a terrorist off ence if the degree of endangerment represented by that behaviour -in relation to a country or international organisation -is insuffi cient. Th is, it is argued, creates a certain protective mechanism, specifi cally in relation to political activist acts with a relatively minor eff ect. 12 A question that can be raised in relation to this fi rst approach is whether the requirement of endangerment as envisaged here makes it too diffi cult to qualify punishable behaviour as terrorist. Weigend stated that, as far as the letter of the law is concerned, the requirement is relatively strict in that an act must cause damage to an entire country or an international organisation, or at least create a real risk of such damage. If this requirement is strictly applied, qualifi cation as terrorist intent is confi ned to the most heinous and dangerous acts. Consequently, an act of the magnitude of the 11 September 2001 attacks would qualify as such, but whether a 'normal' bomb attack by the IRA or ETA would is unclear. 13 However, whether the requirement of endangerment should be viewed so strictly is not evident. It is true that the 11 September 2001 attacks acted as a catalyst for the Framework Decision, but there is nothing to suggest that the Framework Decision should automatically be assigned such a limited scope of applicability. Furthermore, the question of what constitutes 'serious damage' is also similarly vague, 14 such that a less far-reaching explanation may suffi ce. Weigend has consequently sought to provide a basis for a diff erent explanation:
"A sensible interpretation of this clause might take as the point of reference for any 'damage' the ability of the state to credibly fulfi l its main functions of providing basic means of survival and infrastructure as well as fundamental public security to its citizens. 'Damage' to these functions can occur through large-scale interference with the provision of water, energy and traffi c routes but also through random attacks on individuals, which put into question the state's ability to provide protection for life and limb". 15 Th is point of departure would allow the range of acts falling under the scope of terrorist off ences to be wider than those of 11 September 2001, without losing the 11 'Primarily' because the existence of terrorist intent -the third part of Article 1(1) -is then also a requirement. 12 Cf. F. Verbruggen 2004, p.318, who argues that "isolated cases of politically motivated violence" cannot be considered to be terrorist off ences. emphasis on the need for serious damage, or the chance thereof, to be created for a country as a whole (or an international organisation).
Conversely, it is also possible to opt for a relatively fl exible rather than for a relatively strict interpretation of the requirement of endangerment. Th is could be opted for on the grounds that it can be diffi cult to ascertain the degree to which specifi c behaviour in a specifi c case has the ability to seriously damage a country or an international organisation. Possession of weapons and explosives, one of the off ences listed in Article 1(1), is an example of this. Whether such possession is intended to seriously damage a country or international organisation cannot be determined solely on the basis of the off ence itself. More information about what the person involved planned to do with the weapons or explosives would be needed. Similar considerations apply with respect to off ences that do not go beyond an attempt or which have a diff erent -in other words, less serious -eff ect than was intended, such as a bomb that does not explode or causes far less damage than the off ender had hoped. Against this background, a court could decide that it is suffi cient to interpret the requirement of endangerment in a manner that ties in with the nature of the committed off ence: is the off ence generally suited to seriously damaging a country or an international organisation? In addition, or instead, a link could be sought with the off ender's intention: can it be derived from this intention that there was a chance of serious damage to a country or international organisation? In this approach, the requirement of endangerment is viewed in close conjunction with the fi rst and/or third part of Article 1(1). Such a fl exible interpretation of the requirement of endangerment is not contrary to the wording of the Framework Decision as serious damage is not required actually to occur; the possibility thereof is suffi cient. 16 Secondly, the existence or absence of terrorist intent can be regarded as the criterion distinguishing the terrorist off ences listed in Article 1(1) from non-terrorist off ences. In this approach, the causing of serious damage, or the chance thereof, to a country or international organisation is not deemed totally irrelevant since the endangerment criterion is to a certain extent incorporated in the nine categories of punishable behaviour referred to in Article 1(1). 17 Th is list refers to serious punishable behaviour that is in itself suited to causing serious damage to a country or international organisation. Such damage, or at least the chance thereof, will usually occur if an act is committed with terrorist intent. A key aspect in this approach is that it avoids burdening the court with the more concrete, but diffi cult assessment whether there was a chance of serious damage to a country or international organisation. Hence, the A certain condition is contained herein. If the list of punishable forms of behaviour in Article 1(1) were more elaborate and had thus also included less serious off ences, it may have been necessary to give the second part of Article 1(1) a useful and independent role as an objective requirement restricting the possibility to qualify punishable behaviour as terrorist off ence. decisive question concerns the off ender's objective: if that objective comes down to terrorist intent, punishment for committing a terrorist off ence is possible.
Th ere is a certain cohesion between these two approaches. As noted above, it cannot be excluded that the existence or absence of terrorist intent is taken into consideration when interpreting the requirement of endangerment. At the same time it is conceivable that the existence of terrorist intent will be inferred from the nature and context of the specifi c behaviour. Th is does not alter the fact that both approaches are clearly and essentially diff erent. Th e fi rst approach, in which the degree of endangerment is the key issue, is objective in nature. Contrastingly, the second approach is subjective in nature.
COMMISSION'S APPROACH
As noted above, no clear choice was made during the realisation of the Framework Decision as to how the second part of Article 1(1) should be interpreted. Th e Commission's original proposal for the Framework Decision on combating terrorism appears to have made the distinction between terrorist and non-terrorist off ences primarily on the basis of the existence or the non-existence of terrorist intent. 18 Th e Commission's reports evaluating the implementation of the Framework Decision by the Member States do not explicitly indicate how the Commission views the meaning of the second part of Article 1(1). 19 Simply nothing is said about whether or not to include the second part as an objective requirement for qualifying punishable behaviour as a terrorist off ence. It can be concluded from this that the Commission does not in any case object to a Member State's inclusion of such a requirement as an element in national regulations. 20 If the Commission did not regard the second part of Article 1(1) as an independent requirement for qualifying punishable behaviour as a terrorist off ence, it would most likely have raised an objection and claimed that, by including such a requirement in national regulations, Member States were setting more stringent requirements than allowed by the Framework Decision.
It should also be noted that the Commission does not criticize Member States electing not to implement the second part of Article 1(1) as an independent requirement. In my opinion, this can be explained by the fact that the Framework Decision strives for minimum harmonisation. 21 Th e Framework Decision does not preclude Member States from setting less stringent requirements; in other words, making it easier to qualify punishable behaviour as a terrorist off ence. Th is means Th e legal basis for the Framework Decision is found in Article 31(1)(e) of the former EU Treaty, pursuant to which measures can be adopted to draw up minimum regulations with respect to the elements of criminal acts and with respect to punishment.
that it is ultimately up to each Member State to decide whether to include the requirement of endangerment contained in the second part of Article 1(1) as an element in national regulations on terrorist off ences.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above considerations it can fi rst be concluded that it is diffi cult to establish whether the Framework Decision regards the requirement of endangerment contained in Article 1(1) to be an element of terrorist off ences. Several interpretations are defensible. However, the practical importance of that debate -and this is the second conclusion -is minor as the Framework Decision leaves Member States the freedom to deviate from the description in Article 1(1) insofar as they are allowed to set fewer requirements than those set out in the Framework Decision. Th e fact remains, however, that the nature of the specifi c behaviour is not necessarily completely without signifi cance, even if a Member State does not include the requirement of endangerment in its national penal system. Th at signifi cance, however, relates fi rst and foremost to whether there is deemed to be terrorist intent. Proof of terrorist intent depends not only on what those involved state as their motives, but also on objective circumstances that may be taken into consideration. Th ese may include the extent to which a country or international organisation has been, or could have been, seriously damaged. In that case, the approach opted for is subjective in nature, but allows the existence of terrorist intent to be assumed partly on the basis of objective circumstances. Th e Framework Decision allows this approach.
POSITION OF ACTIVISTS, DEMONSTRATORS AND STRIKERS

TERRORIST INTENT AS A DISTINGUISHING CRITERION
In order to clarify the position of activists, demonstrators and strikers under the Framework Decision on combating terrorism, it is important -for the reasons stated below -to specifi cally interpret the meaning of terrorist intent. According to the Framework Decision, terrorist intent can occur in three forms: a. the off ender intends to seriously intimidate a population, b. the off ender intends to unduly compel a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or c. the off ender intends to seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation. Interestingly, from an international perspective it is not common to require a terrorist intent. Several treaties relating to certain terrorist acts have been adopted since 1963. 22 Most of these do not, however, contain a specifi c description of the 'terrorist' aspect of such acts, but merely refer to a certain type of off ences. Terrorism is combated in this framework by applying 'normal' investigative powers and coercive measures, as well as through prosecutions for 'ordinary' criminal acts. Th is allows an adequate response to terrorist activities, providing suffi cient facilities are in place to investigate, prosecute and punish the acts in question.
Th e Framework Decision on combating terrorism opts, however, for a diff erent approach in this respect as it specifi cally regards terrorist intent, at least in part, as an distinguishing criterion. Whether this is the best choice is open to discussion, which I will not enter on this occasion. 23 Considering that terrorist intent has been given such a prominent place in the Decision, it is important to clarify the meaning and scope of this intent.
MEANING OF TERRORIST INTENT
A much de bated question in literature is the relationship between terrorist intent and the political or ideological motives underlying the act. 24 Does terrorist intent coincide with such a motive, or should intent and motive be distinguished from each other? Th e three-way classifi cation formulated by Weigend, based on the study of various international regulations relating to the combating of terrorism, is instructive in this respect. He writes:
"Terrorists typically pursue a triple goal: they have 'normal' intent to commit the base crime of murder, bombing, assault, etc.; they intend, further, to intimidate a group or the population as a whole and/or to compel others to take action (e.g. to release political prisoners); and they have ulterior political or ideological motives, e.g. to destabilize the present government or to defeat a rival religion or ideology. Legal instruments diff er as to the extent to which they require all or only some of these ideal-typical subjective elements for a terrorism conviction". 25 Considering the text of Article 1(1), it can be noted that "ulterior political or ideological motives" do not form part of the defi nition of terrorist off ences. It is suffi cient for the off ender to act with 'normal' intent, as well as with terrorist intent within the meaning Religious motives could also be added to political and ideological motives. However, I consider religious motives also to be political or ideological motives as religious beliefs, in the context of terrorism, are commonly closely connected to, or can be translated into, political and ideological ideas. Th is does not alter the fact that what is stated in the main text also applies to religious motives, if these are to be considered a separate category. of Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision. 26 Th is choice is not entirely self-evident. It is specifi cally the existence of such a motive that is usually seen as an essential element of a terrorist act. 27 At the same time, there are a number of reasons as to why political or ideological motives should not be included in legal defi nitions of terrorism. 28 First of all, there are many criminal law systems in which motive does not play a role. It is the act that is punishable, not the motive behind it. Closely related to this is the second reason: the impression should be avoided that the prosecution is driven fi rst and foremost by a person's political or ideological views. Not requiring a political or ideological motive avoids the need to identify the existence of such a motive during the investigation and trial phase. Th irdly, proving a motive can be problematic as it can be diffi cult to demonstrate that an off ender has a deep-rooted drive if the motive does not manifest itself in some way. Fourthly, delineating the terms 'political' and 'ideological' may cause controversy.
Terrorist intent distinguishes itself from political and ideological motives in that it does not refer to an off ender's deep-rooted drive, 29 but rather to the eff ect pursued through the conduct. A key aspect is that it can be established that the off ender intends to seriously intimidate a population and so on, but not why he is pursuing that objective. Th e terrorist intent will usually, of course, follow from a political or ideological motive, and the desired aim -to seriously intimidate a population and so on -will usually also be a means to achieving a political or ideological goal. However, a court wanting to regard an act as a terrorist off ence does not have to establish what the motive behind the act is.
Th e above shows that, as far as terminology is concerned, a clear distinction can and should be made between political and ideological motives on the one hand and terrorist intent on the other. Th is applies in any case in relation to Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision. 30 Th e question arises, however, as to whether such a strict distinction can also be made in a substantive sense. Can terrorist intent indeed be established without any regard for the off ender's political or ideological motives? Proof of terrorist intent will in any event be easier to establish if the off ender's political or ideological motives are known. 31 It is not unusual for off enders or an underlying organisation to claim responsibility for terrorist attacks and to provide an explanation as to the underlying motives. If, however, an off ender's political or ideological motives are unclear, the existence of terrorist intent -and thus to a certain extent the underlying motive, too -could be inferred from objective circumstances such as the nature and context of the specifi c behaviour. Th erefore, knowledge of the political or ideological motives is not strictly necessary. 32 Another relevant question is whether the defi nition of terrorist off ences becomes too broad if political and ideological motives are disregarded. Does ignoring them carry the risk of including conduct within the scope of the defi nition that generally is not regarded as a terrorist act? In answering this question we can draw on Saul's conclusion that "there is considerable support for the view that terrorism is political violence". Th us, terrorist acts distinguish themselves from "privately motivated violence". 33 Saul argues that a requirement such as terrorist intent is insuffi cient to distinguish between these two forms of violence. Th e existence of terrorist intent can stem from "private concerns such as blackmail, extortion, criminal profi t or even personal duties". 34 Possible examples could include people planting bombs in random places, while indicating that they are willing to stop these acts in return for a large sum of money. In such cases the off enders can be said to be aiming to seriously intimidate the population (as anyone can be a victim of these bombs) and that terrorist intent therefore exists, while this intent does not stem from political or ideological motives, but instead purely from fi nancial considerations. If such forms of "privately motivated violence" are to be distinguished from typical terrorist acts, the underlying motive has again to be considered. 35 It cannot generally be distilled from the legislative history of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism as to how the draft ers dealt with the matter of whether to stipulate the existence of political or ideological motives as a requirement for qualifying punishable behaviour as a terrorist off ence. Whether this has to do with the reasons given above for not including political or ideological motives in the legal defi nition of terrorism, or with an approach as to what should be considered terrorist that is fundamentally diff erent from Saul's aforementioned opinion, cannot be said Inferring a terrorist intent from objective circumstances carries a certain risk as the distinction between terrorist and non-terrorist crimes does not lie solely in the act that is carried out. Th e distinction lies more, at least in part, in the objective -the terrorist intent -of the off ender. If this specifi c subjective requirement is objectifi ed too much, the distinction between terrorist and nonterrorist off ences will blur. See T. Weigend 2006, p. 924. 47 , who -without giving specifi c reasons -argues that applying terrorist intent as a requirement "allows most crime committed for fi nancial gain to be distinguished from those designed to change governmental policy or scare the public at large". with certainty. 36 Th e only thing that is clear is that such a requirement has not been set. Due to this, the Framework Decision has avoided stipulating a requirement that may be diffi cult to apply. At the same time, the scope of the defi nition of terrorist off ences has proved to be rather broad in that it can also include behaviour that is not typically terrorist. More remains to be said, however, about terrorist intent within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision. During the process of draft ing the Framework Decision, some attention was paid to the scope of the defi nition of terrorist off ences, specifi cally with regard to the position of activists, demonstrators and strikers.
DELINEATION REGARDING ACTIVISTS, DEMONSTRATORS AND STRIKERS
During the realisation of the Framework Decision, the draft ers decided to further delineate the defi nition of terrorist off ences in a variety of ways. Apparently, this is because the Commission's original proposal for this Framework Decision, as the Explanatory Memorandum indicates, also had to cover "acts of urban violence". 37 Such violence is easily associated with violence occurring as part of demonstrations by anti-globalists and other political activists. 38 Th is was opposed by several Member States as demonstrations, strikes and other forms of protest cannot and should not be linked to terrorism. 39 Before dealing with the legal interpretation of this issue, it is useful to indicate when demonstrations, strikes and other forms of protest could fall within the scope of the defi nition of terrorist off ences. Th e basic requirement is for a criminal act as referred to in Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision to be committed. Where criminal acts are committed during demonstrations, strikes or other forms of protest, they will not usually be regarded as punishable behaviour within the meaning of Article 1(1), which includes attacks upon a person's life and seizure of aircraft . But is not completely unrealistic either. An example would be the causing of extensive destruction as referred to in Article 1(1)(d). If such a criminal act were to be committed, the objective of the protest action -which is usually aimed at changing or, conversely, maintaining an existing situation -could be linked to terrorist intent, specifi cally the intent to unduly compel a government (or international organisation) to perform or abstain from performing any act. Th is is not precluded by the text of Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision. 40 Th e question, however, is whether this is also intended. Th is issue received attention during the negotiations on the text of the Framework Decision. It can be concluded from Council documents that a majority of the Member States wanted to tie in with the description of terrorism as expressed in the UN Convention on Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, while other Member States pressed for "the most stringent defi nition possible, in order to ensure that legal action, as, for example, in the framework of actions by union or anti-globalisation groups, could under no circumstance fall within the scope of application of the framework decision". 41 Th e way in which terrorist intent is worded in the fi nal Framework Decision is described as "a text (…) which achieves a balance between the need to eff ectively combat terrorist crimes and, at the same time, guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms". 42 Although not explicitly stated in Council documents, the Member States appear to have attempted to achieve this balance by adding the word "unduly" in that part of the defi nition of terrorist intent that pertains to compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, whereas this word is absent in the UN convention.
Th e concerns about the position of activists, demonstrators and strikers infl uenced the Framework Decision in other respects, too. Firstly, the text of Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision stipulates that the Framework Decision "shall not have the eff ect of altering the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union". Th is provision is, to some degree, worked out in more detail in the preamble. Th e preamble states under 10 inter alia that:
"Nothing in this Framework Decision may be interpreted as being intended to reduce or restrict fundamental rights or freedoms such as the right to strike, freedom of assembly, of association or of expression, including the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions with others for the protection of his or her interests and the related right to demonstrate". Note can also be taken of the joint and unanimous statement prepared by the Member States at the time of the adoption of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism:
"Th e Council states that the Framework Decision on the fi ght against terrorism covers acts which are considered by all Member States of the European Union as serious infringements of their criminal laws committed by individuals whose objectives constitute a threat to their democratic societies respecting the rule of law and the civilisation upon which these societies are founded. (…) Nor can it be construed so as to incriminate on terrorist grounds persons exercising their fundamental right to manifest their opinions, even if in the course of the exercise of such right they commit off ences". Th e fact that delineation was sought along various lines indicates that, in spite of the balance the parties attempted to achieve when defi ning terrorist intent, the text of Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision does not in itself draw any clear demarcation line between terrorist and political activist behaviour. 44 At that same time, the text of Article 1(2), the preamble and the statement together show that punishable behaviour occurring in a situation in which fundamental rights, specifi cally the right to strike and freedom of expression, are exercised should not be considered a terrorist off ence. 45 But have suffi cient safeguards been put in place to ensure that the behaviour in such cases will not be qualifi ed as terrorism? Peers has pointed out that when interpreting European law, the European Court of Justice tends not to assign much signifi cance to statements given at the time of legal instruments being established if the contents of these statements cannot be found in the text of the regulation concerned. 46 For that reason, Peers claims that "the legal eff ect of the statement" is uncertain. 47 Two arguments can be raised against this stance. First of all, it is important to note that although the European Court of Justice does not consider itself bound in general to include Member States' statements in the interpretation of European law, this does not mean that such statements are categorically excluded from being an aid to interpreting that law. Th ere are examples of cases in which the Court, directly or indirectly, has made use of statements, both unanimous and otherwise, of Member States. 48 Secondly, Peers seems to ignore the fact that the contents of the statement in this case tie in closely with the provisions of Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision and that the contents can in that sense be found in the text of the regulation concerned. Although the text of the statement is admittedly far more specifi c than the text of Article 1(2), the European Court of Justice seems in situations such as these to adopt a generous stance and to be prepared to further specify the text of the regulation, using a statement by the Member States. 49 In addition, the text of the preamble, too, can play an important role in the interpretation. 50 Th ere is no obstacle, therefore, to take the text of Article 1(2), the preamble and the statement in consideration in the interpretation of Article 1(1). When these sources are considered in relationship to each other, the result, in my opinion, is that the 44 description of terrorist off ences must be interpreted in such a manner that terrorist intent cannot be inferred from the mere fact that an act involves a protest, demonstration or strike in which punishable behaviour within the meaning of Article 1(1) occurs. Th is will prevent a situation in which rallies in which pressure to change or maintain a certain situation is exerted in a legitimate way are suddenly considered terrorist if they spiral out of control. At the same time, the interpretation advocated here will prevent punishable behaviour from escaping being regarded as a terrorist off ence simply on the grounds that it has to be regarded as protest action.
One thing should be noted, however. As stated above, the Framework Decision strives for minimum harmonisation. It does not preclude Member States from stipulating that fewer requirements need to be met for punishable behaviour to qualify as a terrorist off ence. Member States can in principle, therefore, opt to disregard the restriction on the concept of terrorist off ences in relation to activists, demonstrators and strikers, as understood in respect of the Framework Decision. As soon, however, as Member States use that freedom, they also need to realise that fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression will also independently impose restrictions. It is precisely because of these fundamental rights, which the Framework Decision on combating terrorism does not seek to aff ect adversely, that it may be expected of the Member States that they will respect the limits ensuing from the Framework Decision.
CONCLUSION
As explained here, the second part of the defi nition of terrorist off ences in Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision does not compel Member States to include a requirement of endangerment in national regulations penalizing these off ences. Strictly speaking, the second part could therefore be omitted from the defi nition. Member States are, however, free to opt to include a requirement of endangerment in order to avoid the scope of application of the concept of terrorist off ences becoming too broad. Th e second part could also be regarded as relevant for objectively establishing terrorist intent. It has been shown, in relation to the position of activists, demonstrators and strikers, that the description of terrorist off ences must be interpreted in such a manner that terrorist intent cannot be inferred from the mere fact that an act involves a protest, demonstration or strike in which punishable behaviour within the meaning of Article 1(1) occurs at some point. Insofar as not already apparent from the description of terrorist off ences in national criminal law, the court is in this respect obliged to interpret the description of the off ence in conformity with the Framework Decision.
